September 8, 1986 ... I am enclosing a copy of a "sea story" which I wrote for inclusion in some memoirs I compiled for my grandsons. You may find it of interest. If I had my naval career to live over again, I would pay more attention to the welfare of my crews because in retrospect I have come to realize how much I depended on their loyalty and support. Best regards, W.J. Germershausen --------------------------------- BURT'S BROOMS In November, 1944, I was in command of U.S.S. Tambor (SS198), a fleet type submarine on her twelfth war patrol of World War II. We had conducted a moderately successful patrol south and east of Sagami Nada, Honsu, having sailed from Pearl Harbor on October 3, fueled and conducted voyage repairs at Midway Island, and spent until November 8 en route and in the patrol area. We'd had numerous ship and aircraft contacts, developed 4 surface contacts into attacks, and were eventually credited with sinking two of these. One gun attack resulted in damage to an enemy vessel, but ammunition was expended without sinking it. We were ordered to proceed to Saipan. There we moored alongside the tender U.S.S. Fulton on November 8. We conducted voyage repairs and replenished fuel, stores, ammunition, and torpedoes. At a highly classified conference aboard the tender we were briefed on the mission we were to perform. Also attending were the commanding officers of the following boats: U.S.S. Silversides (SS236) CDR J.S. Coye U.S.S. Trigger (SS237) CDR F.J. Harlfinger U.S.S. Sterlet (SS392) CDR O.C. Robbins U.S.S. Ronquil (SS396) CDR H.S. Monroe U.S.S. Saury (SS189) CDR R.A. Waugh U.S.S. Burrfish (SS312) CDR W.B. Perkins The group of seven was formed into a task group called "Burt's Brooms" for Captain Thomas B. (Burt) Klakring, the task group commander. Klakring was an old hand at submarine warfare. He had commanded Guardfish in 1942 in Japanese waters where he had a highly successful patrol. At a press conference he mentioned that he had seen activity at a race track and jokingly told the reporters that some of his crew had bet on the races. The press blew it up and it became quite a story and Burt could do nothing to stop the notoriety that ensued. Despite all this, he was a modest man and a top grade submarine captain. The fleet commanded by Admiral William F. Halsey, Task Force 38, was planning a strike against the Japanese mainland. No such operation had been carried out since the Doolittle raid in 1942. Halsey hoped to use his carrier forces to destroy Japanese warships in their home waters and to wreak havoc on their aviation industry. The raid was code-named "Operation Hotfoot". Our mission, as envisioned by Vice Admiral Lockwood, COMSUBPAC, was to sweep ahead of Halsey's forces and destroy pickets known to be guarding the approaches to Japan, thereby preventing them from alerting the Japanese regarding the approach of Halsey's fleet. Burt Klakring was to fly his command pennant in the Silversides, and he gave us a personal, oral briefing. Among his instructions were orders to leave no survivors, and in case of a contact, to call in adjacent boats and conduct coordinated attacks. We departed Saipan on November 10 and reached the assigned patrol area three days later. We started a surface search at 0600. On the night of the 16th, Tambor made a radar contact at 6,000 yards on a ship identified as an enemy patrol vessel. In firing position, we fired 3 electric torpedoes at 2,500 yards. No hits were obtained. Two exploded at the end of their run. We opened the range to 8,000 yards, ran ahead (an "end-around") and got into firing position at 2,300 yards on hid beam. Three steam torpedoes were fired. Three explosions were heard but no hits were obtained. The target opened fire as we again opened the range at flank speed. We received no damage. I decided to waste no more torpedoes on this target. Our fish were set to explode on contact and this vessel was definitely of shallow draft, so that they probably ran under. The second attack was made at about 0030. For the remainder of the night we tracked the target at 8-9,000 yards. She steered various northerly and easterly courses and at dawn Tambor was 7,000 yards ahead and on her track. At 0530 we submerged and went to stations for battle surface. My intention was to surface 2,000 yards astern of the target. My patrol report read, "A last minute change of course by target nearly ruined the setup as he headed almost directly for us. However, he took such a course as to enable us to surface 2,400 yards on his quarter". What followed was a classic "battle surface" action as we had practiced for years. The procedure is this: you place bow and stern planes on full dive and blow main ballast tanks. When you can no longer hold her down at full speed, you order "battle surface". Bow and stern planes go to full rise. The boat pops up to the surface with the ballast tanks nearly empty to that the hatches can be opened almost at once. The gun crews scramble on deck, cast the 5" gun loose, point and train it at the target and open fire. At the same time, the machine guns, 40mm and 20mm, are brought into action as soon as possible. Tambor's gun crew got the first 5" shot off in less than a minute after the order "battle surface". The first 20mm gun was in action 17 seconds after the hatch was opened. The target returned our fire, but 30 minutes after battle surface the target began to sink. We had obtained a bazooka gun at Saipan and we closed to 250 yards and attempted to finish off the target with this weapon. The bazooka proved to be a poor weapon fired from a rolling deck and no hits were obtained. The 40mm and 20mm guns finally completed the destruction. A number of survivors were clinging to the wreckage. We recovered two. One proved to be wounded. The trainer on Tambor's 5" gun received a serious leg wound from an enemy shell. He was carried below to the wardroom, which is used as a battle dressing station during gun action. This man was Robert E. Baggett, a motor machinist's mate. I sent a message reporting the casualty. COMSUBPAC ordered us to rendezvous with U.S.S. Grayson (DD435), which we did two days later. On November 18, Grayson sent over a medical officer by breeches buoy. He examined the wounded and decided they could be moved by Stokes stretcher. Having some doubts about the Stokes stretcher in the fairly heavy seas running, I sent over the wounded Japanese sailor first. He made it safely so I sent Baggett over. The healthy Jap and the doctor went over by breeches buoy. The other members of the task group had a lively time of it also. Silversides, Trigger, and Sterlet conducted a "coordinated" (?) attack on a patrol vessel. The action was a masterpiece of confusion. Silversides made the initial contact. Sterlet and Trigger converged "according to doctrine". Silversides submerged for an attack but discontinued it when the target began radical maneuvers occasioned by Sterlet's gunfire. Silversides "battle surfaced" at 7,800 yards (!). The target returned fire. Several 4" hits were obtained by Silversides. Sterlet was straddled by enemy gunfire at 5,000 yards and submerged. Silversides thought Sterlet had submerged to avoid a plane contact, so she opened to 8,000 yards. Silversides was straddled. Klakring ordered Trigger and Tambor to join up. Tambor did not receive the message. Later that day we were busy with our own target. Trigger joined 5 hours after initial contact. Silversides, Sterlet, and Trigger opened fire an hour later at 7,000 yards. The little picket boat returned fire and straddled all three. Sterlet and Silversides expended all their 4" ammo and withdrew. Sterlet was ordered to join Trigger "in working the patrol into a position from which Silversides could make a submerged attack." Contact was lost in darkness and the target was still able to make 12 knots. Three hundred rounds of deck gun ammunition were expended without destroying the target. Saury fired torpedoes at a target on the night of November 15, missed, and did not follow up. On November 16, Silversides and Trigger passed through the debris of Tambor's attack. On November 16, Ronquil made contact with two ships. Burrfish, Sterlet, and Silversides all headed for Ronquil. Ronquil and Burrfish sank the two armed trawlers, but Burrfish had two men wounded and Roquil blew two holes in her own pressure hull. Repairs were made at sea to permit Ronquil to dive. On November 16, Sterlet made contact with a patrol vessel and sank it by torpedo attack. On November 16, Saury and Trigger made contact with two patrol vessels. Attack was delayed due to heavy weather. Contact was lost. Trigger regained contact early in the morning, fired a torpedo and missed, opened out to battle surface, was forced down by a plane and lost contact. That night Saury attacked a medium sized tanker, obtained one torpedo hit, but the target escaped. COMSUBPAC called the whole thing off at 1630 on November 17. I half expected to receive a dressing down for not proceeding "according to doctrine" and calling in other boats to assist in my attacks. I admit I took a chance. I cold foresee the type of confusion experienced by Silversides, Sterlet, and Trigger, and decided to handle the bugger alone. Had the three boats not fouled up their operation so hopelessly, I would no doubt have been severely criticized. I believe my gun action was the only battle surface operation against an armed vessel conducted at close range and according to our time-honored training in the entire Pacific war. Klakring was not over-complimentary despite my success. He simply stated, "Tambor battle surfaced on the target's quarter at 2,400 yards and sank the enemy after a well-conducted gun battle." Regarding the three-boat action which he personally commanded, Klakring said, "In this abortive attack the three submarines expanded over three hundred rounds of deck gun ammunition and did not destroy the patrol craft. The pack commander assumes the responsibility for this failure by having elected to 'shoot it out' at long and intermediate ranges instead of closing for the kill. I did not see how we could close the range to this accurate shooting vessel without having one of our submarines holed and I did not consider the prize to be worth that price." I had learned from the gun attack made during the early part of the patrol that battle surface actions conducted from long range are futile. The range must be closed to almost point-blank, so that the first or second shot from the big gun will hit, and you must rely on surprise by popping up out of nowhere on his least guarded quarter.